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I.

Introduction

The impact of Louis Hartz on understanding constitutional liberalism has been
impressive. One of the most subtle reflections on the importance of Hartz is ironically J. David
Greenstone’s reinterpretation of Hartz. Greenstone agrees with Hartz that the liberal political
cultural is central to understanding political change in America. However, unlike Hartz, it is the
conflictual nature of American liberal culture, not its unitary character, which helps us
understand its impact on American politics and society.1 I will outline Greenstone’s vision of the
conflictual, non-unitary American political culture, as he applied it through a critique of methods
of interpreting court action that rely on unitary visions of American political culture.2 I will then
explore a few of the implications of the presence of a non-unitary political culture for how we
can better explain Supreme Court decision making and the place of the Supreme Court in
American political development (APD). In doing so, I draw on work that emphasizes that
Supreme Court decision making is bi-directional between internal institutional norms and
processes and the political, social, and economic world external to the Court.
II.

Greenstone’s Non-Unitary, Conflictual Political Culture

Greenstone, a student of Hartz, presents an alternative vision of the constitutional
regime.3 This vision contains three conflicting accounts of the liberal regime in America: a
republican account, in which political events are interpreted in terms of the opposition between
citizens who can be trained in civic virtue and concerns about the possible usurpations of power
by public officials; a humanist liberal account, which emphasizes the tension between the value
of autonomous individuals pursuing privately determined goals and the need for effective
cooperation in pursuit of broadly shared collective interests; and a reform liberal account, which
emphasizes the interpretation of constitutional norms in terms of a tension between holding
individuals to appropriate moral standards and a social obligation to ensure that every person has
an opportunity to develop his or her faculties.4
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In doing so, Greenstone accepts the Hartzian analysis while transforming Hartz’s static
unitary model into a dynamic one. Thus, political debate over constitutional principles based on
the acceptance or rejection of reform and humanist liberal values is at the core of constitutional
change. The lack of organized class antagonisms in the United States commends us to view or
conceptualize issues of rights in self-development terms, not in terms of social justice with
regard to the fruits of capitalism. Therefore, constitutional issues are critical because we must
frame rights not simply in terms of outcomes, but in terms of the delivery of goods and services
so that self-development can occur. Framing issues in this way requires us to ask what the
individual is doing to "qualify" for government support in terms of his or her own acts of selfdevelopment.
The Constitution and the legal norms of our constitutional regime are not self-enforcing;
they are played out in the life of legal and political institutions. Greenstone writes, "To talk about
operative constitutions is to talk about certain socially accepted and culturally significant rules--whether or not they are formally part of the written document. In the American context, such
rules limit political life, and also help pattern both its conflictual and consensual features."5
Therefore, within and among legal and political institutions conflicting features of American
political culture are meaningful. Moreover, the relationship of history to political culture
constitutes a crucial force for change. In the United States, liberalism functions as a boundary
condition -- as a set of relatively permanent features in a particular context which informs causal
relationships. As a boundary condition it has both behavioral and ideological elements;
moreover, it must be explanatory in the sense that it describes those operative rules (standards of
correct performance) that define the regime.
Of the three conflicting accounts of the liberal regime, republican, humanist liberal, and
reform liberal, republicanism has gained a renewed influence among constitutional scholars. It
argues for an independent, virtuous, and participatory citizenry uplifted by labor, virtue, and a
devotion to the general good of the community. In the founding period, holders of landed
property and those working the soil were viewed as more virtuous than holders of financial
wealth created by economic manipulation. Republicans feared standing armies, and favored
citizen leaders elected for short terms in office and institutional checks and balances. The
framers, as republicans, remained supportive of a liberal creed, but had no comprehensive vision
of human well-being. Questions of individual and social good were left to the citizens
themselves. Republican public-spiritedness solved the liberal problem of coordinating
autonomous, even warring, individuals. Republicanism trusted political institutions to create a
situation where individual virtue could flourish. For Greenstone, republicanism became a liberal
vaccine against a liberal disease.
Republican views of citizen vigilance against government remain today. Republican
norms reject the political analogue to market relationships in which individuals simply seek
personal advantage. Republicanism tells citizens to sacrifice their own interests to preserve a
liberal regime. There is a collective quality of representation without a notion of collective will.
Greenstone argues that “ideas of limited government, virtue, corruption, separation of powers,
and, of course, individual rights” are aspects of “a real American liberal consensus.”6 In the
American context, republicanism was one member of a family of liberal beliefs, all devoted to
the ideal of individual liberation.7 What remains in dispute are broader social and philosophical
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questions, as well as the nature of human personality and the good of society, which are
addressed in more comprehensive liberal theories.
Humanist liberalism accords the high value to the welfare of the individual and to the
liberty of an individual to define his or her own welfare. A good society satisfies individual
desires and preferences in an equitable way, as citizens define their own goals with a minimum
of external constraint from government. Liberty is not an affirmative right to resources from
government; it is a right not to be infringed upon by government. Because politics is not
economics, the role of politics is not to satisfy a complex set of preferences that require
government action. Government, instead, must keep citizens from infringing on the freedom of
each another and must deal with the effects of collective-action problems. It must deal with
market failure when private exchanges among rational self-regarding individuals are not
sufficient. For humanist liberals, the "tension between the preferences of autonomous individuals
and the need for government intervention creates a concern for constitutional rules.”8 Thus,
humanist liberalism says that individuals should choose goals as well as means, provided the
freedom of others to do likewise is respected.
Reform liberals draw on Kant and the Puritans to argue that human beings have an
obligation to develop their physical, intellectual, and aesthetic faculties.9 Reform liberals argue
for the development of language, mathematics, and the practical and moral knowledge vital to
daily living, with the criteria for individual competence established by the community or culture.
There is a collective sense of responsibility for creating a society in which individuals can
develop their faculties, with those faculties that encourage human development being more valid
than those that do not. Constitutional principles that transcend equal access draw on reform
liberal values.10
Reform liberals are liberals, like humanist liberals, because the individual is still the
primary unit of action. However, standards of evaluation for what these individuals’ faculties
should be and how government is to help secure them dominate only reform liberal thinking.
Therefore, humanist and reform liberals hold very different pictures of our constitutional
regime.11 Humanist and reform liberals share a cultural commitment to implementing private
preferences and to the maintenance of a good society, defined as supporting liberty and fair
procedure.12 However, the difference between humanist and reform liberalism reflects a deep
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ambiguity in liberal thought over the scope of individual autonomy.13 Should individuals, or the
broader society, judge the basic goals they ought to pursue? Thus, reform liberalism has a
critique of bourgeois society, a critique that is internal to the liberal enterprise. It flows from the
debates between humanist and reform liberals, and others, who emphasize different strands of
our political culture.14
Historically, reform liberals have sought to use the courts to support the development of
human faculties when political institutions have failed to do so, frequently arguing that such
faculties are linked to changing definitions of the requirements of engaged citizenship. Thus, the
difference between the reform and humanist sides of liberalism has less to do with concepts of
class or group interests than with vastly different cultural and philosophical commitments. For
reform liberalism, the question of when courts should intervene is a question not simply of equal
access and lack of prejudice, but of whether courts should require the state to intervene so that
self-development as a right is facilitated. Thus, when the Plyler Court guaranteed illegal
Mexican immigrant children the opportunity, through education, to ensure their self-development
as future United States citizens, it followed reform liberal principles by taking an active role in
limiting disabilities imposed on immigrant children. It implicitly stated that proactive legal
measures were indeed necessary in order to ensure equal rights under the Constitution. We see
similar sentiments in Brown v. Board of Education (1954).
Humanist and reform liberals both accept the values of representation, individual rights,
and polity principles such as the separation of powers and federalism, but they are divided on the
fundamental philosophical and cultural question of whether the state should be in the business of
actively promoting individual self-development. Therefore, in the American context, the conflict
over what the Constitution means is not simply a question of applying precedent and formulating
a decision that fits existing precedents to the facts in a case. Conflicts over what the Constitution
means involve complex matters of political culture and social practice, including whether one
sees American political culture through the eyes of a humanist liberal or those of a reform
liberal.
In a sense, conclusions about political culture made in “red” and “blue” states involve
different choices along the conflicting elements of the American political culture. Similar
conflicts exist in Supreme Court decision making. How they are resolved and the staying power
of the conclusions that are made by the Supreme Court are not similar, temporally or
substantively, as those found in political institutions. Thus choices of methods of inquiry and
explanations of decision making by the Supreme Court and of the place of the Supreme Court in
American political development are central to whether the impact of the conflicting elements of
the American political culture make it into contemporary constitutional theories and studies of
constitutional change.
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13
Ibid., 444.
14
The radical critique of liberalism may emphasize, as does the reform liberal, the impact of poverty or hopelessness
on the opportunity for self-development. At other times, the conflict may essentially be a conflict over what the
Constitution means, in doctrinal terms, as those who hold the prevailing doctrinal view emphasize. As I discuss
below, the doctrinal and radical accounts overlook the basic division within the American constitutional regime
between humanist and reform liberals; that is, the division between those who have faith in the constitutional regime
as a set of fair procedures for citizens with different personal faculties (the humanist liberals) and those who argue
that society-fostered self-development is a necessary ingredient for social change (the reform liberals). Thus, the
conflict between humanist and reform liberals is fundamentally a conflict over which cultural norms should prevail.

4

Greenstone argues that change is negotiated in our nation though appeals to the
republican, humanist liberal, and reform liberal accounts of American political culture.
Constitutions have three types of rules: constitutive provisions, precepts, and norms.15
Constitutive provisions specify the members of the body politic; identify key political institutions
and assign them particular powers and responsibilities; and establish the rights and obligations of
citizens and public officials. Examples are rules regarding the presidential veto and
congressional override. Constitutive rules most fully resist deconstruction. "Without settled
meanings, these provisions could not establish the framework essential for a complex political
life."16
Precepts advise actors about their most effective courses of action. In democratic politics,
precepts informally shape the constitutional order by giving cues as to when to act and when not
to act. Precepts must be open to revision as new ideas and developments offer better prospects
for success. For example, Greenstone notes that precepts surround members of the American
legislature and executive with regard to using the mass media in appealing to the public and to
using technical experts in the budgetary process. For example, one might see Greenstone's
formulation of precepts in action by examining appeals to and uses of independent prosecutors.
Norms or ethical ideals express enduring cultural and philosophical commitments. They
are "authoritatively asserted by public officials, enshrined in a polity's basic charter, and rooted
in practices of long standing." For example, First Amendment liberties and egalitarian values
from the Civil War and women's suffrage amendments are obvious examples of norms or ethical
ideals.17
Because ideals and commitments are often not fully realized, they identify projects that a
regime continues to pursue. They invite reformulation and revision and thus include elements of
permanence and change. Indeed, when they are wholly accepted and come to define existing
practices, they become constitutive provisions. For example, minorities now have a right to vote,
so this norm has become a constitutive provision. But the larger goal of racial equality is a norm
because it has yet to be realized. Disputes over interpretations of the meaning of "equality" may
readily emerge with regard to this norm. To understand the process through which constitutional
law redefines the rights of groups, who have been subordinated by the political, economic and
social system, we need to explore how these three types of rules interact with the republican,
humanist liberal, and reform liberal accounts of American political culture, and how the Supreme
Court negotiates with the external world outside the Court.
Moreover, in the republican, humanist liberal, and reform liberal accounts, the place of
constitutive provisions, precepts and ethical ideals differs. Republicanism emphasizes
constitutive provisions in the Constitution. Political events are interpreted in terms of opposition
between the good of citizen virtue and the evil of usurpation of power by government officials,
such as with regard to questions of impeachment. In many instances, the language of constitutive
provisions is that citizens are good and public officials are bad. This language determines how
the government is molded. There is a normative statement in republicanism: structures of citizen
power and of weak officials will produce adherence to the Constitution.
Humanist liberals, with an eye to preserving a viable political market, are concerned with
precepts that specify key actors, procedures, and institutions to deal with market failure.
Directions on maneuvering in such well-defined situations provide a very thin cultural dimension
15
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to humanist liberalism. Thus, in the humanist liberal case, the emphasis is on precepts that
facilitate effective action to secure individual liberty. Events are interpreted in terms of the
tension between the value of autonomous individuals pursuing privately determined goals and
the need for effective cooperation in pursuit of broadly shared objectives. Precepts are developed
to preserve a viable political market; they specify key actors, procedures, and institutions to deal
with market failure.
Reform liberalism emphasizes the importance of constitutional norms. These norms are
interpreted in terms of a tension between holding individuals to appropriate moral standards and
an obligation to see that every person has the opportunity to develop his or her faculties. The
nation asks whether we trust moral rules to keep citizens in line or whether government must
support opportunities for citizens to develop their faculties. Thus, Greenstone emphasizes that
simplicity is not basic to our constitutional order. A charter or constitution that includes both
norms and precepts, which by definition are in a continual or permanent state of becoming, will
not function smoothly on behalf of any single project or goal. Norms and precepts are in a state
of constant revision; constitutive rules, precepts, and norms vary in prominence depending on the
problems facing the nation.18
III.

The Conflict-Full American Political Culture and the Study of the Supreme Court in
American Political Development

A.

The “ Doctrinal View" and its "Radical Critique" --- As Unitary Theories

Greenstone criticizes models of politics, political change, and court decision making that
view cultural values as consensual. They fail to provide an adequate understanding of the
relationship between political thought and action because they do not respect the frequently
dialectical fabric of American thought and politics which is caused by a non-unitary political
culture. To demonstrate this, he focuses his attention the "prevailing doctrinal view," which
treats the Constitution as "the ultimately authoritative text for adjudicating legal disputes," and
on its "radical critique," which sees the Constitution as "a weapon wielded by one economic
interest or another.”19 The doctrinal account is flawed because it assumes that the regime's
fundamental premises require a basically impartial polity and judicia1 system, while strict
impartiality is simply not possible. It thus incorrectly assumes that the Constitution consists of
neutral principles and that the courts and other agencies that interpret the Constitution are
devoted to the dispassionate adjudication of these essentially neutral principles.20 Judges do not
interpret law merely on the basis of neutral principles, nor is the Constitution composed of
neutral principles. The doctrinal account also ignores the Constitution's social bases and biases.
Procedures that are neutral on their face may promote inequalities in practice. In the United
States, the effects of liberal politics reinforce the effects of liberal economics.
The radical critique of the doctrinal approach is flawed because it incorrectly assumes
that courts regularly sanction outcomes that have a pronounced class bias or other type of social
18
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bias and that law is simply an instrument for achieving partisan objectives, typically those of the
socially and economically privileged. The problem with radical critics is that they "ignore the
fact that the United States does have a constitutional regime... [and that] the American
Constitution imposes a range of real restraints on political actors that the free market does not
impose on buyers and sellers.” In the United States, the Constitution and constitutional rules are
regarded as final and determinative. "As a text," Greenstone argues, "the Constitution is not
indefinitely deconstructable .... American constitutional practice exacts obedience from all
comers."21
Greenstone finds that the two approaches share several areas of agreement that
oversimplify the place of law and the courts as forums for social change. First, each approach
emphasizes the role of political interests. For holders of the doctrinal approach, it is the view that
there is an impartial adjudication among political interests; for their radical critics, it is the
dominance of a single faction. Second, the two sides agree that "the Constitution specifies the
rules of the game, fair or unfair, within which the clash among economic groups or particular
litigants takes place." Third, each approach agrees that "the constitutional order has legitimated
some modes of conflicts while proscribing others, such as the open resort to violence by private
parties." The fourth area of agreement is that "certain substantive constitutional issues are no
longer matters of active dispute."22
Therefore, the problem with both accounts of the role of law and courts in our society is
that they "treat political issues as conflicts of interest. Neither account ... views the Constitution
primarily as a cultural system that helps Americans understand and cope with intrinsically
puzzling or ambiguous events." Both approaches are buying into a consensus perspective on
American political culture, one based on the premise that "clashes over cultural matters can be
ignored because American political culture as a whole is so powerfully, uniformly liberal."23
This agreement on the consensual nature of American political culture obscures for both groups
the relevance of culture to politics. Each view agrees on the existence of a fundamental
consensus in the American political order, acknowledging our polity's "thoroughly liberal
character, but neither view takes into account the complexity of that liberal character."24 In
addition to accepting American political culture is consensual, they also agree on a narrow
definition of interests, the manner in which the struggle is conducted, and even who wins and
looses. From the doctrinal perspective, Greenstone argues, "[t]he Constitution is the liberal
framework that all politically active groups accept. For the radical critics, a dominant liberal
culture has systematically, via the Constitution, excluded all significant alternatives to a liberal,
capitalist society." In either case, Greenstone argues, "political conflict is restricted in the
economic sphere to the clash of specific interests.... Both the doctrinal and radical views
implicitly adopt a consensual view of American political culture as the point of departure,
however much they differ on the normative merit of the consensus."25 Moreover, through the
acceptance of the consensual nature of our nation’s culture, each group of scholars "obscures the
possibility that a culture can be pervasively liberal without being consensually so."26 By focusing
on specific conflicts of interest, they fail to sufficiently emphasize that the citizens of a liberal
21
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polity must reconcile the value of liberal autonomy with the need for political authority and the
overall needs of society.
B.

The Conflict-Full American Political Culture and Bi-Directional Supreme Court Decision
making Process

I want to refocus Greenstone's argument about the problematic nature of static or
consensual visions of American political culture. I want to emphasize that the problem with the
doctrinal view and its radical critique is not simply that both view the American political culture
as unitary. I want to emphasize that it is the reinforcing effects of both accepting the American
political culture as unitary, and that the doctrinal approach centers only on internal Court
decision-making and its radical critique centers only on the world external to the Supreme Court
as sources of explanation of doctrinal change, that make both approaches incapable of furthering
our understanding of the Supreme Court in American political development. Both approaches
assume that the worlds internal and external to the Court are separate, and that the interaction
between internal Court decision-making and the social, economic and political world outside the
Court is not important. When these two factors join the fact that the doctrinal approach views the
place of legal institutional norms and principles as important to Court decision-making and its
radical critique does not (because of its focus on the automatic effects of the social, economic,
and political stasis ON Court decision-making), we can attain a more precise understanding of
why each approach is wanting. Thus, at the core of the doctrinal approach is the view that
justices only take legal precedents and constitutional principles seriously in making
constitutional choices. Radical critics take the internal for granted as they argue for the
prominence of the economic and social inequalities of our capitalist nation (factors outside the
Court) as explanations of Court action. Thus, the doctrinal approach is almost completely
internal-looking, and does not place Supreme Court decision making within the wider world
outside the Court; the external radical critique assumes that institutional norms, court process and
principles are not explanatory of Court action.27
Another reason why the doctrinal approach and its radical critique differ is their quite
different assumptions as to what constitutes knowledge. The radical critique is built on legal
realist premises that knowledge must be based on scientific naturalist principles and that
knowledge can only be defined as that which is gained through the study of empirical data, using
scientific methods. For something to be knowledge, it must be based on particular factual
referents, and scientific replication of the findings must be possible. Also, the radical critique
accepts non-Euclidean principles which view logical systems of ideas as unable to constitute
knowledge. Nor can systems of ideas be studied scientifically, in part, because their complexity
cannot be broken into empirical referents.
Doctrinal theorists, in contrast view Supreme Court decision-making as based on respect
for foundational values and deductions from such values, a process which can’t be explained
under scientific rationalist or non-Euclidean principles. Holders of the doctrinal view,
incorrectly, see judging as simply mechanical, as a system of logic. They view the process as
27
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internal to courts and refuse to recognize that at the core of Supreme Court decision-making is
the incorporation of the social, economic, and political world outside the Court.
Moreover, both doctrinal internalists (law) and legal realist externalists (politics) view
questions of doctrinal change as a process of “law versus politics.”28 This, plus the assumption of
a unitary American political culture, makes both approaches incapable of explaining doctrinal
change and the place of the Supreme Court in American political development. Both reject the
importance of the conflicting elements in American political culture within and outside the
Court, and most importantly, fail to show how the debates over these elements within and
without the Court inform each other. Thus, the fact that the political culture is not unitary, and
that its elements are in active play whenever constitutional choices are made within and without
the Supreme Court, require the development of a methodology for studying the development of
constitutional law and the place of the Supreme Court in American political development that
respects these premises. This methodology also requires that when we study how these elements
inform constitutional choices in the Supreme Court (and lesser courts) and more directly
politically accountable institutions that we respect the importance of differences between courts
and political institutions with regard to internal institutional norms and practices, and how they
interact with each other and with the external social, economic, and political world in which both
are embedded.
This methodology must respect that the relationship between courts and political
institutions is bi-directional, as is the relationship between courts and the political, economic, and
social structures external to the Court. This methodology must be bi-directional; it must take
seriously the fact that what happens inside and outside the Court and political institutions is
important for explaining doctrinal change in the Supreme Court and the constitutional debate in
the wider society. We must not assume that place of doctrine and legal norms and boundary
mechanisms of courts and political institutions are similar. Such a methodology must respect
how the Supreme Court and political institutions differ in institutional norms and decision
making processes, and how the view of the past, present, and future inform constitutional
choices.
We cannot assume that courts and political institutions process the conflicting values of
the American political culture in the same way, or that aspects of that culture will be highlighted
at the same time in history, because of the institutional differences between the Supreme Court
and more directly politically accountable institutions, such as Congress, state governments,
presidents, and political parties. Moreover, the difference in institutional norms about the role of
precedent (backward-looking) and aspiration in legal principles (forward-looking) and their
relationship in courts and political institutions means that the processing of the different elements
of American political culture in constitutional law, and their staying power, compared to political
institutions, will be different.29 Finally, we must study how patterns of path dependence within
courts and political institutions differ, and what informs whether courts and the politics outside
courts are in alignment in their decisions. Viewing Supreme Court decision-making as bidirectional and as based on a conflicting political culture also may help us make institutional
comparisons in history. For example, because of the presence of a bi-directional process between
28

See Ronal Kahn and Ken I. Kersch, “Introduction,” in Ronald Kahn and Ken I. Kersch, The Supreme Court and
American Political Development (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006): 1-30, for an explanation of why
constitutional change should not be viewed as a process of law “versus” politics.”
29
See Mark Tushnet, “Popular Constitutionalism and Political Law,” Chi-Kent Law Review. (forthcoming 2006), for
the argument that for the most part courts are backward-looking and political institutions are forward-looking.

9

Court and society, we may find that, instead of the “waning” of political time that Stephen
Skowronek found in the historical development of the Presidency, the “legal time” of the
Supreme Court may not be waning.30 Such a finding may help us understand decisions of the
Supreme Court at times are so at odds with the politics outside the Court.31
C.

Popular Constitutional Theory

The centrality of conflicting elements of American political culture to constitutional
change, the bi-directionality of Supreme Court decision-making, and differences in the way it
and political institutions process the conflicting values of the American political culture, raise
serious questions about theories of popular constitutionalism by such prominent scholars as Mark
Tushnet32 and Larry Kramer.33 This may be because they presuppose that a civic republican
stance is the core value which should be optimized in constitutional theory. They do not see the
importance of full range of conflicting values in American political culture. These scholars
assume that more participation is better than less participation, and that the quality and range of
participation, is the most important variable to consider in a theory of the “best” process for
making constitutional law.
They argue that courts (as compared to more directly politically accountable institutions)
should not be viewed as more legitimate venues for making constitutional choices. This view is
not simply because of the civic republican values of these scholars and their rejection of the
importance of humanist and reform liberal values within American political culture. Their
support of popular constitutionalism also results from their failure to take seriously the presence
of a bi-directional Supreme Court decision-making process, in which doctrine and legal norms
and the external social and economic world are important.
Moreover, rejecting the importance of differences between courts and political
institutions, popular constitutionalists tend to overemphasize the place of legal principles within
political institutions and public debate. If there are conflicting accounts of American political
culture, and if institutional differences between the Supreme Court (lesser courts) and more
directly politically accountable institutions are important to the way such values are incorporated
into their decision-making, than arguments for trusting politics and taking the Constitution away
30
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from the courts are suspect. For example, if institutional norms, such as stare decisis, result in
the Supreme Court keeping alive precedents based on reform liberalism when the nation is in a
period of humanist liberalism (as we find our nation today), and the Court is bi-directional as it
applies reform liberal premises, than we can envision a situation in which a conservative court in
a conservative era makes decisions which are counter to the social and political proclivities at a
specific point in history. Lawrence v. Texas (2003) and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania (1992) can be explained in such terms.
Taking the Constitution TO the courts in general, and to the Supreme Court in particular,
may be more supportive than trusting politics for social change because courts are more likely to
consider the three conflicting accounts of American political culture, both in precedents and
through their application at first instance. Finally, if the Supreme Court’s processing of the
conflicting elements of American political culture is bi-directional, that is, if both doctrine and
the external social, political and economic world are central to its decision-making, there also is
reason to question the emphasis that scholars of popular constitutionalism place on the countermajoritarian difficulty of the Supreme Court.
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